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on the African continent. On the other hand, the high visibility of the Chinese entrepreneurial activities has also sparked anti-Chinese sentiments among many African entrepreneurs (for example, see Baah et al. 2009 Independent Chinese entrepreneurs in Senegal and Ghana face allegations of endangering indigenous businesses and encroaching on local market spaces. We argue that this reputation is fed by a mystified idea of the Chinese presence in Africa in general, and it is reproduced, perpetuated, and reinforced by rumors in and about the local marketplaces. Stewart and Strathern (2004: 4) note that rumors play a vital part "in the formation of moral imagination and the development of social processes." Thus, we suggest that the allegations against Chinese migrant entrepreneurs commonly voiced in our country cases, Senegal and Ghana, have been informed by a paramount myth of the Chinese in Africa rather than the empirical reality. In the recent scramble for Africa's natural resources, Chinese state-financed projects are usually pitched in terms of a win-win situation. However, media reports reframe these engagements as interest-led and denounce Chinese development initiatives as disguised seizure of Africa's resources. Added to that, academic discourse outside of China has only recently shifted its tone towards the potential opportunities of China's engagement in Africa (for example, see Cheru and Obi 2010) . In this regard, individual viewpoints on the Chinese in Africa have burgeoned into a myth of implacable Chinese industriousness fed by their discipline and creative potential to adapt but also by allegations of human rights and labor law violations, along with other problematic practices such as land-grabbing or environmental degradation (see, for example, AllAfrica.com 2011 , Global Post 2011 . Myths, Barthes established, contrary to the everyday usage of the word do not refer to doubtful truths but instead describe a culture's way of conceptualizing an abstract topic in chains of cultural referents. 1 Myths are thus central to culturally specific processes of signification, or in other words, without their conceptualizing myth, phenomena would mean different things to the beholder, if anything at all.
While the existing literature uncritically adopts local anti-Chinese discourses and thus fails to unveil the dynamics underlying them, our research in the urban centers of Accra and Dakar paints a more complicated picture. This paper provides a comparative perspective on the commercial activities related to China trade in the urban centers of Senegal and Ghana, aiming to deconstruct the public representations of the extent and impact of Chinese commodity imports in these countries. Contrasting these discourses with the empirical observations from fieldwork conducted in early 2011 in the capitals of Ghana and Senegal where we conducted in-depth ethnographic interviews with a sample of 52 local traders (Ghana: n=22; Senegal: n=30), 69 Chinese businesses, as well as various interest groups and authorities, we seek to demystify discourses of Chinese business strength in Accra and Dakar. 6 Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel: The Chinese Commodity Imports in Ghana and Senegal We will first present the discourses and the resistance of Senegalese and Ghanaian merchants towards the Chinese presence before elaborating on the context in which the imports from China to the two African countries have developed over the last 30 years. Then, we will integrate the results of our observations and the import statistics of Chinese merchandise in order to demystify the rumor according to which the Chinese petty entrepreneurs are the exclusive source of economic problems currently affecting African businesspeople.
Tales of Chinese Migrants and Commodities
If one sets foot into any of Dakar's or Accra's numerous markets these days, rumors about Chinese encroachments and invasions are buzzing from all angles. Interest groups and social networks of traders in Ghana and Senegal propagate claims, in increasingly aggressive tones, of existential threats caused by the business activities of Chinese migrants. The high visibility of the Chinese migrants and of Chinese commodities sparked an intensive circulation of obviously biased tales. The most prominent rumor circulating the Ghanaian market was the suspected sale of Accra's heart of economic activities, the Makola Market, to a Chinese investor. 2 In view of earlier anecdotes of Ghanaian store owners whose running rental contracts had been canceled due to substantially higher bids from prospective Chinese tenants, this rumor transported an existential anxiety across different interest groups. In Senegal, similar sentiments were expressed over the alleged sale of the grounds of the Kawsara mosque.
Our fieldwork in Accra and Dakar revealed the largely univocal character of allegations targeting the Chinese communities in the two cities. This suggests that discursive representations of Chinese migrants are at the very least amplified by the traders' associations based in the two West African capitals and later disseminated in the form of rumors. In Ghana, the Ghana Union of Traders' Associations (GUTA) acts as an umbrella organization of the numerous commodity associations in the country. In 2005 and 2007, GUTA organized a series of demonstrations "against foreigners, particularly the Chinese, from taking over the retail business" (Debrah 2007 ) in which they also called for a review of the Ghana Investment Act. Established in 1994 to protect the retailers, GUTA argued, the act did not fulfill its mission, because foreigners freely entered the retail business, resulting in "unfair" competition characterized by advantageous exchange and interest rates (interview No. 8 on 03 February 2011 in Accra). Additionally, GUTA affiliates claimed, the influx of foreign goods represented a threat to autochthonous manufacturers, the tax system, and, last but not least, state security (Odoi-Larbi 2007).
2 Makola Market is an array of four integrated markets and public spaces used for retail activities (31 December, Okaishie, Kwasia Dwasu, Rawlings Park), from which the Accra Municipal Assembly collects daily market fees. According to news media coverage, the traders were contacted by a representative organizing the bid (Tenyah for Ghana Telescope, 2011 ) but threatened to chase away the investor in a mass demonstration (interview No. 6, Makola Traders' Union, 01 February 2011 in Accra) . The Accra Municipal Assembly representative for the market refuted these allegations as mere rumors, claiming that it was legally impossible to sell public land (interview No. 11, Accra Metropolitan Assembly, Makola Office, 04 February 2011 in Accra).
The Ghana Investment Act defines a number of "enterprises wholly reserved for Ghanaians." 3 These exclusive economic domains include "the sale of anything whatsoever in a market, petty trading, hawking or selling from a kiosk at any place." A "market" here means "a public or open place established by local custom or by the appropriate local government council for the purpose of buying and selling and any other public place used substantially for that purpose" (Ghana Investment Act 1994). Thus excluded from wide ranges of the retail trade, foreign investors also are subject to a minimum equity contribution of 10,000 USD for foreign investors in joint ventures, and 50,000 USD for projects wholly owned by foreigners.
Trading companies, whether partly or fully foreign-owned, require a minimum foreign equity of 300,000 USD and must employ at least ten Ghanaian workers (ibid.). In the middle of the 1990s, African merchants moved from Hong Kong and Dubai to Guangzhou. In the beginning, traders mostly from Nigeria and Mali were traveling to Guangzhou (Martinez 2008; Le Bail 2009; Bodomo 2010a ); Ghanaians and Senegalese followed. This shift was explained by the fact that Guangzhou offered cheaper products, mainly because in the proximities of the producers in China's Guangdong Province, traders could cut out the middlemen, which lowered the cost at which a product could be imported (Pawson 2005) .
While Africans, especially long-term students, had "always" lived in places like Hong Kong, Macau, Beijing, and Shanghai, according to Bodomo (2010b) competitors who, operating on lower profit margins, manage to offer the same commodities at lower prices. In the orientation towards the West, online distribution channels play an increasingly important role, but the diaspora in these parts of the world also has its stake in the setting up of new business contacts and supply channels. These products imported from wholesalers in Europe, especially Italy and the U.S., often also come from Chinese producers, if not from the same assembly line. In general, the originality and authenticity of a product is constructed at the time of its purchase in the West African market (interview No. 2 on 01 February 2011 in Accra). As a common sales argument puts it, in Ghana and Senegal, Chinese commodities sold outside China were "made for the European market" and thus followed higher quality standards. European and American imports are the most highly valued, but products purchased in Bangkok and Dubai also still enjoy higher prestige than purchases from Yiwu and Guangzhou. Conversely, findings by Nadi (interviews conducted by Nadi in October 2010 and March 2011) suggest that successful and established African traders also switched from "Euro-American" supply sources to Chinese ones after realizing that those suppliers themselves import from China, merely claiming that their commodities were superior in quality.
Besides these ulterior marketing strategies -which justify higher prices in the Asian supply centers outside of China with an assumed difference in quality -it is with diverse considerations in mind that wholesalers choose the place to buy their stock. In general, traders choose their commodity source according to experiences in the past, the availability of contacts, and the range of commodities and available options for personalization. Yiwu and 
African Trajectories of Chinese Commodities into Urban West Africa
Despite the fact that West African traders constantly adapt their business strategies (such as the choice of the commodity hub) in an effort to meet the requirements of an ever-changing business environment, West African traders going to China, irrespective of their eventual destination, reproduce trade relations that have been developing in the informal sector since the time of the caravans. The structure of the encounter and the transaction remains the same whether a trader travels to Casablanca, Bangkok, Dubai, New York, Hong Kong, or Yiwu.
Irrespective of site or targeted commodity, traders today work like their great-grandparents did in the past -that is, like in Casablanca for the Senegalese case (Marfaing 2007: 165) .
Traders meet an intermediary in China, usually an African who has been in the location for a certain amount of time. Often, these intermediaries in China are young Africans who have moved there for their studies. In the beginning, students deciding to work as intermediaries may find employment in an agency but after a while they usually build up their own client base (Le Bail 2009). African agencies -there are approximately 15 Senegalese agencies in Guangzhou at this point -can handle about seven clients at a time. Each office employs at least one guide responsible for driving new entrepreneurs through the cities and to the Chinese producers and wholesalers. Beyond these services, the agency takes the responsibility for contacting wholesalers, handling the orders and negotiating the grouping in containers for shipping. Thus, in addition to the provision of intermediary services such as guiding and translation, agencies also act as sourcing and forwarding agents, solving the logistic problems of the business transactions. The high level of responsibility involved in the work of the agent may explain why traders have a preference for agents of their own nationality. As Darkwah notes for the transient 5 nationalistic networks of Ghanaians in Asia, the members of the Ghanaian community in these foreign towns often share similar experiences as migrants, the community is often quite closely knit. As such, it is almost impossible for any one of these migrants who work for the transnational traders to abscond with monies given them (Darkwah 2007: 213) .
On the other side, traders who remunerated the migrants badly for their services would also lose their reputation and thus have difficulties finding these services upon their next visit (ibid.: 214). Another reason why African traders prefer the services of their countrymen andwomen is that they get benefits that they would not get from or give to non-compatriots However, it happens that traders face disappointments when unloading their containers, notably in terms of the quality of the commodities, but also in terms of the ordered colors and sizes. "In China, if you order gray you get pink," traders complain, or, "after two months in the container [during shipment], the shoes were all rotten so I had to throw away all of them" (interviews No. 2 on 31 January in Accra and No. 7 on 02 February 2011 in Accra).
This obviously reduces traders' profit margins as shipping is too expensive to process re- At the same time, women in particular often continue on their conventional paths to Dubai and other Asian destinations according to their needs and personal experiences. With the Chinese suppliers, they feel forced to buy very big quantities in order to operate profitablywholesalers in Yiwu and Guangzhou also supply small quantities but do so at higher prices per piece -thus it is sometimes more interesting for the merchants to buy from intermediary wholesalers in other countries (interview No. 2 on 31 January 2011 in Accra). Other traders continue also to pass through the European capitals where they study and buy fashion articles for them to be remade cheaper in the second station of their trip, China. In this commodity group, they refrain from buying more than 50 to 100 articles of the same model in order to avoid having to cut the price and stockpile but, in turn, have to accept higher production prices per piece (interview No. 31 on 25 February 2011 in Dakar).
The number of importers who can afford the trip (flight and visa costs, etc.) to purchase Chinese goods from Asia is limited. Another big group of importers purchases Chinese commodities in the proximate countries, notably Benin and Togo, in the case of Ghana. Ghanaian wholesalers prefer the wide range of Chinese products from around the harbor cities of Lomé and Cotonou to the products of Chinese wholesalers in Accra. Wholesalers who usually travel to China also stock up in neighboring countries in case they run out of stock. This is, however, only to bridge the time before their next trip to Asia.
The free port of Lomé is a significant hub for trade in West Africa, especially in the highvalue commodity of wax prints (Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010) . 7 Our research in Accra has shown, however, that the direction of trade is currently swinging backwards, with Togolese coming to Accra to purchase tennis shoes and similar goods in bulk. The reason why particular commodity groups are flowing in particular directions is not least politically motivated.
In Ghana, certain items attract a special import tax in order to protect local industries. As there is a lack of a viable shoe industry in Ghana, shoes do not attract this tax and are thus attractive import products (Darkwah 2001: 3) . Wax prints, on the other hand, represent a highly politicized commodity. Framed as a measure to protect local employment and indigenous intellectual property (interview No. 6 on 01 February 2011 in Accra), the wax print trade in Ghana is today highly regulated as a response to the massive influx of Chinese textiles after the 1980s donor-mandated opening of the local markets (Axelsson and Sylvanus 2010) . to Senegal through Mauritania -or drapery, which reaches the Senegalese markets through Gambia.
In some instances, it is not only the wares that are transcending the regional borders but also the markets themselves. Ghana, one Nigerian informant explained, is too small a market to be attractive for direct Chinese imports in some commodity groups. These particular commodities are imported into Africa's most populous nation, Nigeria, and from there reach Accra from Lagos by land. These discursively skewed conclusions circulating in the public spheres of both Ghana and Senegal usually confound a number of dimensions of the presence of Chinese commodities in the two West African countries: the level of total imports from China, the total amount of Chinese businesses in the host societies, and, finally, the share of these migrants in the total imports from China. In this section, these dimensions will be disentangled in order to test the common allegations. The first dimension is on the level of total imports.
As illustrated in Table 1 , the volume of Chinese imports in Senegal is limited despite a more recent increase in imports from China in Senegal. While the Senegalese statistics (Table 1 ) from the start put the discursively spread allegations against Chinese businesses into perspective, in the case of Ghana (Table 2) , macroeconomic indicators at first glance point more in the direction of the accusation commonly voiced in public discourse. The steeper share in imports from China to Ghana may be explained by the size of the Ghanaian market compared to the Senegalese market and the rising demand produced by Ghana's expanding middle class (Yeboah 2000) . However, this first indicator commonly implied in the traders' discourses is not sensitive to the nationality of the importing agents. In fact, the substantive arrival of the Chinese traders in Ghana and Senegal around 2005 is only one of many potential factors responsible for the increase in imports from China to Ghana and Senegal. This hypothesis is supported by the steady rise in Chinese import shares in Ghana from 2000 onwards -that is, before the substantial inflow of Chinese migrants. This idea is further underscored by the second indicator commonly implied in public discourses: the total number of Chinese migrant entrepreneurs in Senegal and Ghana.
The general trend of independent Chinese migrants increasingly flocking to Africa is widely accepted in academia; however, statistics estimating the actual number of Chinese entrepreneurs in African countries are contradictory. According to Gu (2011: 13) , even the Chi-nese government at this moment does not know how many Chinese private entrepreneurs currently operate in Africa. As of now, hearsay estimates the number of Chinese migrants in Senegal at less than 10,000 people. Besides the administrative personnel and employees of the large-scale, state-financed Chinese building projects (e.g. the Dakar National Theatre or parts of the port of Dakar, or roads, especially in Saint-Louis and Touba), this estimate also includes independent Chinese migrants. While it is difficult to obtain information from the Chinese embassy on the exact number of Chinese businesses in Dakar, statistics on imports of Chinese origin declared at Senegalese customs in Dakar allow us to calculate the share of Chinese businesses located in Senegal among enterprises engaging in the importing of consumer goods from China. The following table (Table 3) illustrates a decline in the number of Chinese importers from 2007 onwards, suggesting that Chinese entrepreneurial migrants no longer find the market interesting and have decided to move on. This trend is despite the fact that legislation is more restrictive in Ghana than in Senegal.
In view of these numbers, allegations of an encroachment on a market hosting several thousand local entrepreneurs in Accra alone can be put into a different perspective. However, the absolute number of Chinese business operators in Dakar and Accra is only meaningful when seen in relation to their particular business size and import values. While Chinese businesses in Senegal are typically small, Chinese independent entrepreneurs in Ghana are now clearly dominating certain market segments, particularly the shoe sector, where they appear to move a tenfold number of containers compared to their local counterparts in the same commodity group. As a matter of fact, the limited and, in the case of Senegal, decreasing number of Chinese importers alone does not suggest that the Chinese migrant businesses are insignificant competitors. It is possible that the concentration of imports will continue to increase -that is, a smaller number of entrepreneurs will continue to claim ever-bigger market shares. This possibility can be ruled out by contrasting shares of Chinese imports by local and Chinese importers. 
